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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
minute. Its attempt to set up these licenses as a defense of course was
futile since it clearly had exceeded them.
At the same time this general statement of the legislation and the
action of the Secretary of War under it, points the way out of the
present difficulty. The legislation gives the Secretary of War extensive
powers in the matter. A license by him increasing the amount of water
which Chicago may divert until such time as proper sewage disposal
plants have been erected, will protect not only the interests of Chicago
and its inhabitants but the interests of those outside of Chicago and
will also preserve the lakes themselves-all this within the strict mean-
ing of the judgment of the Supreme Court which, as already mentioned,
granted its injunction, "without prejudice to any permit that may be
issued by the Secretary of War according to law."
That this result is highly satisfactory to all concerned, excepting
uncompromising Chicagoans of the "I will" variety, is beyond a doubt.
The United States Supreme Court by this decision has again demon-
strated how important is its place in the Government and affairs of the
nation, and how vital it is to the well-being of us all. A situation such
as this would, in Europe, lead to war and the flowing of blood. In the
United States, it merely leads to a law suit and the spilling of ink.
In referring to the city of Chicago, the writer of this note is, of
course, fully aware that it was, technically speaking, the Sanitary Dis-
trict which took the reprehensible action. This district was organized
by the Illinois Legislature independently of the city of Chicago, because
the very inhabitants of Chicago, for good and sufficient reasons, did
not wish to give to their city council, with its grey wolves, additional
power. While the district covers territory outside of the city limits,
the denizens of Chicago constitute such an overwhelming majority of
the inhabitants of the district, that the writer believes that he is justified
in treating, for the purposes of this note, the city as identical with the
district.
War: Confiscation of alien property: Construction of enemy
Trade Act.-Swiss National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Thomas W.
Miller and Frank White. 45 Supreme Court Reporter 213. The
appellant plaintiff had a Swiss charter though its stockholders
were largely German, at least during the war. It was engaged
in business in Germany while hostilities were in progress. It transacted
business in the United States during the fateful days of 1917 and 1918.
To obtain the necessary licenses it had deposited about one million
dollars worth of bonds with various state treasurers. These securities
were seized by the alien property custodian one week after the
Armistice. There can be no question but that this sequestration was
permissible since the Enemy Trade Act expressly included any cor-
poration incorporated in any other country other than the United States
and doing business within the territory of any enemy nation. Its appro-
priateness at the particular time when the war was practically though
not theoretically at an end presents another question with which the
courts, however, are not concerned.
NOTES AND COMMENT
More than a year before the war officially terminated by the adoption
of the peace resolution of July 2, 1921, (42 Stat. IO5, io6 c. 40)
Congress, on June 5, 192o, amended the Enemy Trade Act by providing,
among other things, that if the owner of the seized property was "a
citizen or subject of any nation or State or free city other than Germany
or Austria or Hungary or Austria-Hungary, and is at the time of the
return of such money or other property hereunder a citizen or subject
such nation or state or free city," the sequestered property was to be
delivered back to him. The great question before the court was whether
this Swiss Insurance Company was a citizen or a subject within the
meaning of this provision. The court by Chief Justice Taft, in answer-
ing this question in the negative, freely conceded that the term citizen
or subject standing alone would be broad.enough to include this par-
ticular claimant and even cited cases in support of this proposition.
Its decision was based on the fact that there was an additional clause
in the same enactment which provided for a return of seized property
to corporations incorporated within any foreign country whose stock
was, at the time of the sequestration, entirely owned by non-enemies and
was so owned at the time of the return. Says the court: "Had not
clause 6 been inserted in the act, possibly the words citizens or subjects
of clause i might have been held to include corporations; but with a
specification of them as a separate class, it would violate an obviously
sound rule to include them by construction in clause i also as citizen or
subjects."
The result is that the alien property custodian retains possession of
this property though all reason for such retention has passed away.
The construction of the court, while perhaps technically correct, seems
to do violence to the spirit of the act. It overlooks the obvious fact
that statutes are frequently loosely drawn and are not intended to be
masterpieces of the close application of logical principles. Relief will
probably be sought by an amendment of the Enemy Trade Act by
Congress. The resulting tinkering -with legislation to fit individual
needs is one of the outstanding faults of our legislative system and
deserves to be discouraged in every way possible. The decision will
probably impede rather than expedite the liquidation of the enormous
trust estate still held by the Alien Property Custodian. If it should
result in a comprehensive amendment of the Enemy Trade Act it would,
of course, prove to be a blessing in disguise.
It is not surprising that the court was not unanimous in its holding.
Justice McReynolds filed a long dissenting opinion in which he stressed
particularly the intent and purpose of the Enemy Trade Act to conserve
and utilize enemy property upon a basis of practical justice and to
prevent the owner from receiving benefits therefrom until after the
war but without ultimate confiscation. He contends that the amendment
of i92o is entitled to receive a liberal construction in favor of the
plaintiff. Those who are familiar with the history of the liberal con-
struction of such famous legislative landmarks as the statute of uses
or the statute of Elizabeth concerning charities will readily see that the
court, if it had yielded to the contentions of the plaintiff, would have
been well within the general policy pursued in the construction of these
old statutes.
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The case is of interest as bringing again into the foreground
the question whether a corporation is really a separate entity apart from
its stockholders or merely a giant partnership with the liability of the
partners strictly limited. The prevailing opinion lays stress on the fact
that most of the owners of the corporation resided in Germany during
the war and thus leans toward the partnership theory. The dissenting
opinion stresses the entity theory and regards the corporation as a
citizen or subject of the country where it is incorporated, no matter who
its stockholders might be. Perhaps this contrariety was not consciously
felt by the writers of either opinion, yet it is possible that it furnishes
the key to the differences between them.
C. Z.
Wills: Blindness of testator; validity of will.-In re Bakke's Will,
199 N. W. 438 (Wis.). The validity or invalidity of the execution
of wills has raised a number of very nice questions of law, among which
not the least prominent is the question of the effect of the blindness of
the testator on the validity of his will. Two questions arise in dis-
cussing this subject: first, whether a blind person has sufficient testa-
mentary capacity and second, whether he has the ability of knowing
the contents of his will.
In Wisconsin, the statute on the execution of wills reads, "No will
made within this state . . . shall be effectual to pass any estate . . .
unless it be in writing and signed by the testator or by some person in
his presence and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed
in the presence of the testator by two or more competent witnesses in
the presence of each other..... .,,
The statutes regarding who may devise or bequeath property read
as follows: "Every person of full age and any married woman of the
age of eighteen years and upwards, being of sound mind, .2 This
phrase is the deciding factor in Wisconsin as to who has testamentary
capacity in the- devising of both real and personal property.
In reference to the first-named statute, the question usually evolves
around whether or not the clause "in the presence of" must be construed
so as to mean that the testator must see the persons signing as witnesses
or signing for him at his express direction. At this point, the further
question arises as to whether the testator knew the contents of the will.
Both of these questions will be fully discussed later.
In the present case, the facts were as follows: Guinhild Bakke, a
woman of sound mind but blind and partially deaf, made her will on
October II, 189o. She was a widow holding eighty acres homestead
as a life estate and 28o acres in fee. The contestant, Mrs. Stern, a
daughter, received her share of the estate when her father died. No
question of mental capacity or undue influence was raised but the only
ground of contest was the blindness of the testatrix. The defense
contended that the burden of proof resting upon the proponents was not
satisfied by the evidence and that there must be, under the circumstances,
'Sec. 2282, Wis. Stats. 1923.
'Secs. 2277 and 2281, Wis. Stats. 1923.
